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Bounding War: the Institutional Logic of Prohibitions on Militarized Bargaining

It is a familiar observation that the possibility of war permeates relations among states under anarchy. It is less well appreciated that states deliberately and routinely regulate that possibility by delineating prohibitions on the use of militarized bargaining. Three ambitious examples of such prohibition – the rule of non-aggression embedded in the Covenant of the League of Nations (1920), Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), and Charter of the United Nations (1945) – have attracted enormous attention from political scientists and historians alike. Few scholars appreciate that these three instruments are, however, only the most well-known cases inhabiting a much broader universe. Indeed, across the past two centuries alone, various groups of three or more states concluded over 97 legal instruments containing 120 distinct provisions variously circumscribing the right and ability of different states to engage in militarized bargaining. Despite their ubiquity in modern international relations, states’ use of such prohibitions is documented only incompletely and rather imperfectly understood. Why do states enact them? What explains variation in their design? And what does the practice of such prohibitions tell us about the ability of states, especially the great powers, to cooperatively limit the use of military force in the international system? In this lecture, Anatoly Levshin will articulate a new institutionalist theory that resolves these questions. He will provide guidance on the use of prohibitions on militarized bargaining as policy instruments and, drawing on extensive archival research, develop new narratives of the origins of some of the most familiar prohibitions, including the rule of non-aggression articulated in Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

 

Anatoly Levshin is a postdoctoral fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School at Harvard University. He is presently affiliated with two fellowships at the School’s Belfer Center: Technology and Geopolitics and the International Security Program. Anatoly is also Director’s Fellow with the Reimagining World Order research community at Princeton University, which he formerly co-curated with its director, G. John Ikenberry. Anatoly’s research explores fundamental international-security issues from the standpoint of world order. His first book project, Bounding War: Rules of Neutralization, Demilitarization, and Non-Aggression and the Institutional Logic of Prohibitions on Militarized Bargaining, investigates the history and theory of the rules of neutralization, demilitarization, and non-aggression as instruments for the bounding of war in the international system. Anatoly is also interested in the geopolitical implications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as an emerging technology. He is currently investigating the ability of specialized AI systems, trained specifically in the strategic logic of interstate bargaining, to reliably assist policymakers, advisors, diplomats, and statesmen in negotiating complex international challenges. Anatoly’s second book project, tentatively entitled The Geopolitics of Digital Oracles, will explore the risks and benefits of national-security applications of AI more generally and consider alternative models of arms control that states can draw on to manage strategic contests supercharged by competitive deployment of rival AI systems.

 

Host
Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies

Cosponsor
Brooks Tech Policy Institute

Start Date: May 1, 2025
Start Time: 12:00 pm
Location: Uris Hall